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ADmINISTRATIvE LAW-PENSIONS-EXCLUSIVENEqS OF ADm.INISTflATIVb
RniEoY.--44 Stat. 828 (1926), 38 U. S. C. § 620 (1927) provides that the
decisions of the pension officials shall be final and conclusive. The plaintiff
brought suit in Massachusetts to annul the divorce of her deceased husband,
Corkum, and his subsequent marriage to the defendant in the state of
Washington; to enjoin the defendant from receiving pensions as Corhmm's
widow; and for an accounting by the defendant for pensions already
received. Held, that an injunction and accounting be denied, but that a
decree be entered declaring the plaintiff to be the widow of Corkum under
the laws of Massachusetts. Cork-an v. Clark, 161 N. E. 912 (Mass. 1923).
The rule that the federal courts will not review the discretionary acts of
federal administrative officials is well established. United Statc v. Babcock,
250 U. S. 328, 39 Sup. Ct. 464 (1919) ; (1927) 37 Yx L. J. 255. In granting
pensions the government is conferring a privilege or bounty, and the
pensioner acquires no right to future payments which the legislature
may not modify or take away entirely. United States v. Teller, 107 U. S. 64,
2 Sup. Ct. 39 (1882); Dale v. The Gorernor, 3 Stew. 387 (Ala. 1831). But
cf. Smith v. Aplin, 80 Mich. 205, 45 N. W. 136 (1S90). So when a fcderal
pension board has denied a claimant the right to a pension the fcderal
courts have no power to review the decision. United States v. Black, 128
U. S. 40, 9 Sup. Ct. 12 (1888); cf. Sibcrschchz v. United States, 266 U. S.
221, 45 Sup. Ct. 69 (1924). Nor may a state court review the dccision of
a state pension board where the statute makes the decision of that board
final. Board of Trustees v. McCrory, 132 Ky. 89, 116 S. W. 326 (1909).
A fortiori it lacks this power with reference to a federal pension law con-
taining a similar provision. Stokely v. De Camp, 2 Grant 17 (Pa. 1849);
see Foot v. Knowles, 4 Metc. 386, 390 (Mlass. 1842). The refusal of the
court in the instant case to do by indirection what it could not do directly
seems proper. It is the settled policy of the federal courts to 'avoid con-
flicts of jurisdiction with state agencies. See United States v. Mooney, 263
Fed. 988, 991 (E. D. Pa. 1920). Therefore the reciprocal attitude evi-
denced in the instant case is commendable. Moreover, the determination
whether for purposes of the pension laws the Massachusetts or Washington
marriage shall prevail would seem to be more properly left to the pension
board. One entitled to a pension is not deprived of his claim thereto by
the fact that a pension has been granted and payment made to the wrong
party. Gigo's Case, 8 Op. ATry. GEN. 377 (1857). Hence, having exhausted
her remedy in the state court, the plaintiff may still properly present her
claim for final adjudication to the pension officials to whom the pension law
has given this exclusive power.
ADMIRALTY-MARrThIE WORK OF LOCAL CHARACTER-STATE Coz ,i.sA-
TION LAW APPLMED.-The plaintiff was injured in the course of his employ-
ment, while attempting to push a stranded boat into navigable waters. He
was awarded damages under the California Workmen's Compensation Act.
Held, on appeal, that although the work was maritime, it was essentially
local in character *and thus did not require the exclusive jurisdiction of
admiralty law. Judgment affirmed. Star of Iceland, 192 Am. Mar. Cas.
768 (U. S. 1928).
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When an injury occurs on navigable waters in the performance of a mari-
time contract, it.appears well settled that admiralty law alone is applicable.
So,. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524 (1917) (state com-
pensation act not applicable); Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219,
44 Sup. Ct. 302 (1924) semble. However, local compensation acts are
applied when the injury does not occur on navigable waters. State Com-
mision v. Nordenholt, 259 U. S. 263, 42 Sup. Ct. 473 (1922) (longshoreman
killed on dock). Similarly, when the contract is non-maritime, although
the injury occurs on navigable waters. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v.
Rhode, 257 U. S. 469, 42 Sup. Ct. 157 (1922); Los Angeles Shipbulding Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 57 Cal. App. 352, 207 Pac. 416 (1922). The
instant decision follows a line of recent cases which seems to modify the
broad rule of the Jensen case to the extent that, where the work being per-
formed is held to be of a "local character," though of a maritime nature,
and under a maritime contract, the local compensation act is applicable on
the ground that no material prejudice occurs to the required uniformity of
maritime law. Miller's Underwriters v. Brand, 270 U. S. 59, 46 Sup. Ct.
194 (1926) (diver from anchored barge suffocated); United Dredging Co. v'.
Lindberg, 18 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) (river channel dredge boat
engineer drowned). Recent state court decisions are in accord. Balostrero
v. Industrial Commission, 266 Pac. 968 (Cal. 1928) (fisherman drowned);
United Dredging Co. v. Industrial Commission, 267 Pac. 763 (Cal. 1928)
(dredging employee drowned). It would seem that the determination of
what is "local" can not be subject to accurate prediction, and must await
the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in each instance.
AGENCY-FRAUD OF AGENT-NOTICE TO THIRD PARTY oF AGENT'S ADvRsmn
INTEREST-The plaintiff gave a power of attorney to an agent to manage
certain of his affairs, and instructed his bank by letter to allow the agent to
draw checks on his account "without restriction." The agent bought a Rolls-
Royce car from the defendants, giving them a check signed by him as
attorney. The plaintiff in the lower court recovered the amount of the
check. Held, on appeal, that the agent had apparent authority to draw
the check, and the defendants had no notice that he had exceeded his
authority. Judgment reversed. Reekitt v. Barnett, Pembroke and Slater,
[1928] 2 K. B. 244.
Where an agent acts within the express terms of a power of attorney,
though actually for his own benefit, a third party dealing with the agent
will be protected if he has no notice of the agent's adverse interest.
Hambro v. Burnand, [1904] 2 K. B. 10. But when the third party knows
or has notice of the agent's breach of faith he is responsible, as, for exam-
ple, when he has received a payment out of the principal's funds. Gerard
v. McCormick, 130 N. Y. 261, 29 N. E. 115 (1891). So, too, when a broker
takes a check from an agent, drawn on the principal's account, in connec-
tion with speculations of the agent. Lamson v. Beard, 94 Fed. 30 (C. C. A.
7th, 1899); John v. Dodwell & Co., [1918] A. C. 563. 'Similar responsibility
attaches where an agent repays a personal loan with a check signed by
him as agent. Coleman v. Stocke, 159 Mo. App. 43, 139 S. W. 216 (1911);
Bisehoff v. Yorkville Bank, 218 N. Y. 106, 112 N. E. 759 (1916) (bank
responsible as payee). The payment of trust funds in the purchase of
property for private use may put the vendor on notice. Squiro 'v. Orde-
mann, 194 N. Y. 394, 87 N. E. 435 (1909) (executor buying saloon). And
a payee taking an agent's check in payment for personal services cannot
claim protection as the holder in due course of a negotiable instrument.
Coffin v. Tevis, 164 App. Div. 314, 149 N. Y. Supp. 986 (1st Dep't 1914).
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But a bank does not have notice and is not responsible on the mere receipt
for deposit in an agent's personal account of a check signed by him in his
representative capacity. Empire Trust Co. 'v. Cahan, 274 U. S. 473, 47
Sup. Ct. 661 (1927) ; Corporat ion Agencics v. Home Bank of Canada, [1927]
A. C. 318; Comment (1926) 35 YAL L. J. 854. It is apparent that the
courts are chiefly concerned in such cases with the question whether the
person paid "suspects, or ought to suspect" a breach of trust. See Rochcs-
ter v. Paviour, 164 N. Y. 281, 286, 58 N. E. 114, 115 (1900). The court's
discussion in the instant case of the question of "authority" or "apparent
authority" does not seem to bring out that question clearly. An agent
is undoubtedly not privileged to make presents to himself. See 1 Mr clzm,
AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 740. The real issue then would zeem to be whether,
on the facts, the defendants could reasonably assume that the agent re-
quired a Rolls-Royce in his capacity as agent.
APPEAL AND ERROR-CRIMIINAL LAW-CONSWERATION ON APPEAL OF Eraon
iN TRym.-The defendant, a negro, was on trial for the murder of a white
child. Relatives of the deceased, supported by many spectators, attempted
to seize the prisoner and drag him from the courtroom. The demonstration
was quelled, and the trial proceeded to a conviction. The defendant made
no objection to the disturbance and raised the question of mistrial for the
first time on appeal. Held, inter alia (two justices disscntbag), that the
question could not be considered in the absence of proper exception in the
trial court. State v. Newsomze, 143 S. E. 187 (N. C. 1928).
In general, error committed on the trial is not revievable on appeal
unless an objection is made in the trial court. Weinstciut r. Laughlin, 21 F.
(2d) 740 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); State v. Glazebrook, 242 S. W. 928 (31o.
1922). This is so where the trial court could have, by proper admonitions
and instructions, at least theoretically corrected the impression made on
the jury. Hanye v. State, 211 Ala. 555, 101 So. 108 (1924) (weeping by
deceased's widow in murder trial); People v. Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 223 Pac.
65 (1924) (remarks of trial judge). But where the erroneous impression
could not have been "corrected," the error will be considered on appeal,
though no objection be made. People v. Caldwelt, 55 Cal. App. 280, 203
Pac. 440 (1921) (extended comment of trial judge made with obvious
deliberation). Likewise, a "radical fault" in a trial for a crime involving
the liberty of the defendant will be noticed and corrected by the revic.ing
court, though there be no proper objection or exception. Skuy v. United
States, 261 Fed. 316 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919) (arguments appealing to race
prejudice). Moreover, in a case involving a capital offense, the defendant
may raise questions of his constitutional rights for the first time on appeal.
State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 60 Pac. 403 (1900). Although it would seem
that this should not be allowed where capital charges are not involved.
(1928) 37 YALE L. J. 821. But ef. Bishop v. State, 19 Ala. App. 326,
97 So. 169 (1923) (right to public trial). The impression on the jury
in the instant case would hardly seem eradicable by any remarks of the
court, and would, furthermore, seem to have resulted inevitably in such
prejudice against one on trial for his life as to constitute a violation
of the constitutional right to a fair trial.
APPEAL AND ERROR-SUMMONS AND SEVEUANcc.-From a decree against
co-defendants, the appellant alone appealed. The appellee moved for dis-
missal on the ground of nonjoinder without summons and severance. The
appellant then asked permission to join its former co-defendant, which
later appeared, sua spo ate, and sought to be joined. Held, that the appeal
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must be dismissed because of the lack of summons and severance. Ameriean
Baptist Society v. Barnett, 26 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
In the absence of joinder on appeal the early English cases hold that a
party desiring to prosecute an appeal might summon the other parties to
join him, and if they failed to do so the court would issue a judgment of
severance. See Thq Lord Cromwell & Andrews, Yelv. 3, 4 (1602); 2 LILLY,
ABRIDGMENT (2d ed. 1745) 662. And thereafter the party might prosecute
his appeal alone. 9 BACON, ABRIDGEMENT (Bouvier's ed. 1846) 268; see
note to Jaques v. Caesar, 2 Saund. 100 (1682). The procedure barred the
non-joining parties from thereafter prosecuting that cause of action.
BACON, op. cit. supra at 273. Where the parties to a judgment were before
the court, but some refused to prosecute the appeal, a judgment of sever-
ance might issue without a summons. 20 VINEnR, ABRIDGMENT (2d ed. 1793)
55; see Manly v. Lovell, Hard. 317, 318 (1673). But joinder by amend-
ment on appeal could not cure a lack of summons and severance. Ratelig
v. Burton, Cas. T. H. 135 (1735). The requirement of summons and
severance was strictly adhered to in the early American cases. Andrews V.
Bosworth, 3 Mass. 222 (1807); Fotterall v. Floyd, 6 S. & R. 315 (Pa. 1820).
But at present some states, by statute, allow geparate appeals. See Marshall
v. Matson, 171 Ind. 238, 243, 86 N. E. 339, 342 (1908). Others will not
require the historical summons and severance when the parties had actual
notice of an appeal, and failed to appear. American Trust Co. v. Fennell,
78 Fla. 535, 83 So. 386 (1919). But cf. Mills v. Teel, 244 Ill. 39, 91 N. E.
83 (1910). And as in the situation of the instant case a nonjoinder may
sometimes be cured by amendment on appeal. See McJunkins v. Stevens, 88
Fla. 559, 568, 102 So. 756, 760 (1925). The federal courts still require
summons and severance. Priest v. Seaman, 266 Fed. 844 (C. C. A. 8th,
1920). However, they do not require strict compliance to the form of the
summons and severance. See Masterson v. Herndon, 10 Wall. 416, 418 (U.
S. 1870). But federal courts do not allow the defect of nonjoinder to be
remedied by amendment. Mason v. United States, 136 U. S. 581, 10 Sup Ct.
1062 '(1890). Separate appeals by the parties to a judgment have been dis-
missed rather than consolidated. Holbrook v. Menard, 145 Fed, 498
(C. C. A. 2d, 1906); Interurban Ry. v. Menard, 145 Fed. 500 (C. C. A.
2d, 1906). Contra: Firor v. Taylor, 116 Md. 69, 81 Atl. 389 (1911) (in
state court). The ruling in the instant case that the lack of summons and
severance was fatal even though the parties sought to cure the defect by
amendment seems entirely in accord with legal history, and with the
practice of the federal courts. However, a severance after expiration of
the time for appeal might be allowed. Cf. Richards v. American Bank,
234 Fed. 300 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916).
BANKRUPTCY-STREET RAILWAYS-PERSONS WHO MAY BE ADJUDICATED
BANKRuPT-Following an order by the State Railway Commission to re-
store trolley service which the plaintiff had discontinued, mandamus pro-
ceedings were instituted in a state court. The plaintiff filed petitions for a
stay of proceedings in the state court, and for a bankruptcy adjudication.
-The lower court held that because of its capacity as a public servant the
plaintiff was not entitled to the benefits of bankruptcy, and revoked the
stay of mandamus proceedings. Held, on appeal, that the decree be affirmed.
Columbia Railway, Gas & Electric Co. v. South Carolina, 27 F. (2d) 52
(C. C. A. 4th, 1928).
Prior to 1910, the Bankruptcy Act, holding the court open to corporations
engaged principally in "manufacturing, trading, . . . or mercantile pur-
suits," was construed to exclude public utilities generally, in view of the
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public interest in their continued operation. Mattcr of Hzedson River Pw2cr
Trasmission Co., 183 Fed. 701 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910) (generation of electric-
ity). This construction found an additional foothold in contrasting the
generation of electricity or the transportation of water with the dictionary
definitions of "manufacturing" and "mercantile." Mattcr of I. Y. & Wcst-
chester Water Co., 93 Fed. 711 (S. D. N. Y. 1900) (water companies trans-
port rather than manufacture or sell water). Under the 1910 amendment
to the Act any person except a "municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking
corporation" may become a voluntary bankrupt. 36 STAT. 839 (1910), 11
U. S. C. § 22 (1927). The first tendency was to consider the public service
criterion no longer applicable as a rationale of exclusion from either volun-
tary or involuntary proceedings. City of Holland -e. Hollard City Gas Co.,
257 Fed. 679 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919) ; 1 CoLun, BANnurrcY (13th ed. 1923)
197. And the term "railroad" was narrowly construed to permit a street
railway to become a voluntary bankrupt. Matter of Grafton Gas & Elcetric
Light Co., 253 Fed. 668 (N. D. W. Va. 1918). The instant case, in stress-
ing the public service character as a test of exclusion, while departing from
a strict statutory interpretation, is perhaps none the les, justified. The
financial problems of public service corporations usually come to a head in
foreclosure proceedings in equity, and the service is maintained by receiver-
ship pending reorganization. CRAVATH, So.c PHASES or CoRnrAEz Fi-
NANCING (1917) 154. Such reorganizations often include not only a reap-
portionment of creditors' claims, but also a readjustment of the corporate
stock structure. The bankruptcy court, so far as the decisions go, has not
sufficient flexibility to deal with these problems, nor can it give to new money
a lien prior to existing claims, as is essential. losenberg, Rcorganiza!ion
-The Ne.xt Step (1922) 22 CoL. L. REv. 14.
BA-NKS AND BANKri--ForGED INDoRSE=rT-EFECT Or FMUPX To
PxruRN VoucHERs IN AcTIoN AGINST BA,.K.-The defendant bank paid
certain checks over forged indorsements. The plaintiff, depositor and
drawer of the checks, promptly notified the bank of the forgeries but
refused to return the vouchers. In an action to recover the amount paid
out on the checks, judgment was given for the defendant. Held, on appeal,
that to be entitled to recover, the depositor must, if requested, return the
vouchers in order to facilitate the bank's recovery over. Judgment af-
firmed. Showers v. Merchant's Nat. Bank, 142 AtI. 275 (Pa. 1928).
Generally, a depositor's failure to give notice of a forged indomzc-
ment is no defense to the bank unless the opportunity to recover over
has been prejudiced. Mu,.rphy v. Metropolitan Banl,,, 191 Mass. 159, 77
N. E. 693 (1906) (suit by depositor); Marroviche v. American Trzet Co.,
132 Misc. 128, 229 N. Y. Supp. 110 (Mun. Ct. 1928) (suit by payee);
Note (1909) 20 L. R. A. (:q. S.) 89. So too where the maher's name
has been forged, or the check has been raised. Critt v. Chc,:icaz
National Bank, 171 N. Y. 219, 63 N. E. 969 (1902); Maryland Casaleg
Co. v. Dickerson, 213 Ky. 305, 280 S. W. 1106 (1926) (raised draft);
Arant, Forged Checks-The Duty of A Depositor to His Bank (1922)
31 YAMn L. J. 598. And the same rule applies even though the banl:,
on the depositor's monthly statement of account, had specified a shorter
period within which notice should be given. McKeen v. Boatnmans' Ban:,
74 Mo. App. 281 (1898). However, some courts conclusively preume
that the defendant's opportunity to recover over has been impaired and,
therefore, deny recovery. Leather Mfrs. Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 117
U. S. 96 (1886); see MeNeeley ,. Bank of North America, 221 Pa. 53S,
595, 70 Atl. 891, 392 (1908), 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 79 (1909) (arguing
257
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a supposed analogy to rule requiring holder of note to make demand and
give prompt notice regardless of maker's solvency). A few early deci-
sions took the further step of denying recovery when the depositor failed
to return vouchers irrespective of any specific showing that the bank
was prejudiced. Van Wert Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 6 Ohio C. C.
130 (1891); of. Rick v. Kelly, 30 Pa. 527 (1858) (promissory note);
Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank, 17 Mass. 33 (1820) (bank notes). It
is probable that these holdings would not be generally followed today.
See Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Home Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 615,
182 Pac. 293, 299 (1919). Surely so, where the vouchers are stolen, ac-
cidentally lost or destroyed. Furthermore, if failure to give notice is not
necessarily a bar, there is little reason for a definite rule that in order
to recover, the vouchers must be returned. Thus the rule of the instant
case might well be limited to a situation where the bank shows that
its opportunities for recovery over have been materially impaired.
CARRIERS-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-COUNTERCLAIM TO ACTION BY RAIL-
ROAD.The plaintiff railroad sued the defendant for freight charges. The
defendant counterclaimed for damages to the goods during transportation,
Held, on demurrer to the counterclaim, that it could not be interposed under
the Interstate Commerce Act and the acts amendatory thereto [34 Stat. 584
et seq. (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1928)], because of the danger of rate
rebates through collusion between shipper and railroad, and consequent dis-
crimination against other shippers. Pennsylvania R. R. v. South Carolina
Produce Ass'n, 25 F. (2d) 315 (E. D. S. C. 1928).
The courts have gone to great extremes to destroy opportunities for con-
cessions, discriminations, and rebates by carriers. United States V. Keon.
ing Coal Co., 270 U. S. 512, 46 Sup. Ct. 392 (1926); (1924) 9 MINN. L. REV.
67. They are permitted to recover, or are required to refund, any difference
between the rate imposed and the published tariff. (1927) 37 YAIX L. J.
989; (1926) 26 COL. L. Rnv. 479. And they are forbidden to undertake by
contract to expedite shipments at regular rates. Chicago and Alton R. R. it.
Kirby, 225 U. S. 155, 32 Sup. Ct. 648 (1912). Nor may they waive a pro-
vision in a bill of lading requiring damage claims to be filed within a cer-
tain time. Fay v. Chicago R. I & P. Ry., 186 Iowa 573, 173 N. W. 69
(1919); Metz v. Boston & M. R. R., 227 Mass. 307, 116 N. E. 475 (1917).
Moreover, they cannot extend credit to shippers for the payment of freight
charges. Hocking Valley Ry. v. United States, 210 Fed. 735 (C. C. A. 6th,
1914). But ef. Cincinnati Northern R. R. v. Beveridge, 8 F. (2d) 372 (E.
D. Va. 1925). Nor pay for supplies by releasing a claim for freight. Lako
& Export Coal Corp. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 1 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A. 4th,
1924). One court has recently gone so far as to hold that a grain elevator
makes a rebate in giving a refund to a shipper on all grain raised by the
elevator company. Spencer Kellogg & Sons v. United States, 20 F. (2d)
459 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927). And courts will disregard the corporate entity in
running down subterfuges. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Tran.
Co., 142 Fed. 247 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1905) ("commissions" to dummy cor-
poration held rebates to defendant). The result of the instant case does not
seem desirable, if the reason is merely that of possible collusion. The pos-
sibility of collusion is hardly diminished by forcing the defendant to bring
a separate suit, an obvious hardship to a bona fide claimant, and undesir-
able from the point of view of trial convenience. A view contrary to that
of the instant case has been taken. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Pioneer
Grain Corp., 26 F. (2d) 90 (D. Minn. 1928); Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Cunco,
241 Fed. 727 (S. D. N. Y. 1917). The zealousness of the court in the
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instant case to guard against the possibility of rebates may be well con-
trasted 'with another recent decision which presents an opportunity for
rebates through vacillating accounting methods. Partridge Lunzbcr Co. v.
Michigan Cent. R. R., 26 F. (2d) 615 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) (court held to
be without jurisdiction, because claim by railroad for reimburzement on
account of excessive refund to shipper 'was not a claim arising from the
carriage of goods).
CONTRACTS-DURATION OF AGRErIaENT TO FuRNISH GAs.-The plaintiff
and the defendant mutually agreed that the plaintiff was to light all of the
defendant's public lamps during specified months of the year at a certain
rate. No stipulation was made with regard to the duration of the contract,
After eighteen years, the defendant, desiring to terminate the agreement,
gave the plaintiff four months notice. The plaintiff brought action for a
declaration that the notice to terminate was of no effect and inoperative.
The lower court dismissed the action. Held, on appeal, that the contract
was not perpetual, and that the defendant had the power to terminate it
by reasonable notice. Crediton Gas Co. v. Crediton Urban Distrct Council,
[1928] 1 Ch. 447.
It is not often that a promise will properly be construed as calling for
perpetual performance. 1 WIMISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 38. But courtz
have given that construction to certain negative promises. Fliuna v. Cartcr,
59 Ala. 364 (1877) (promise to forebear suit); Hazscr it. Hardi2g, 120
N. C. 295, 35 S. E. 586 (1900) (agreement not to carry on a business).
In some cases where great expenditures have been made in reliance on a
license, the licensor is estopped from revoking. Marldcy . Christcn, 220
S. W. 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); see McartJy -. Kicrnan, 118 Ore. 55, 01,
245 Pac. 727, 729 (1926). A fort ion, 'where such obligations vere incurred
in reliance on a contract. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Penn. Co., 129
Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 3d, 1904). Some courts have regarded silence as to a
time limit as evidence of the parties' intention that the contract should
be perpetual. See Rossmasler v. Spielberger, 270 Pa. 30, 40, 112 Atl.
876, 880 (1921). But generally, in the absence of circumstances show-
ing a different intention, in a contract of hiring where no definite period is
expressed, the law will presume a hiring at will. Anz'rcan McrcieatG
Marine Ins. Co. v. Letton, 9 F. (2d) 799 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920); Wardc;,,v.
Hinds, 163 Fed. 201 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908). That the parties in the instant
case intended their arrangement to be perpetual seems hardly inferable.
The fact that they were both corporations with, theoretically, perpetual
existences, is not conclusive of such intention. See Tyler v,. Bruce, 104
Minn. 167, 172, 204 N. W. 644, 646 (1925). Furthermore, the plaintiff
corporation was organized prior to the making of the contract and its ex-
penditures were not made solely in reliance on the contract with the defend-
ant, as the plaintiff contemplated doing business with other parties and
regarded the defendant merely as an additional customer. Cf. (1928) 44
L. Q. Rnv. 277.
Co-oPERATmIV MARxKETING--BREACH OF CONThAGcT-PEiNALTY on LIQUwATED
DA .GES-The d fendant had contracted with the plaintiff society to de-
liver all hops grown by him on his sixty-three acres during 1926. The
damages for any breach were stipulated at 100 1. an acre. Just before har-
vest time, the defendant leased all of his land to a company which was, in fact,
controlled by him. In an action by the society for 6300 L liquidated dam-
ages, the trial court held that the defendant was privileged to alienate the
land. Held, on appeal, that judgment be entered for the plaintiff for the
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amount claimed upon the grounds, inter alia, that there had been a breach
of the contract and that the sum was not illegal as a penalty. English Hop
Growers Ltd. v. Dering, [1928] 2 K. B. 174.
The usual rule in these cases has been to pierce the subterfuge and hold
the member to his contract. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n W,
Devine, 217 Ky. 320, 289 S. W. 253 (1926) (member taking lease in daugh-
ter's name); Kansas Wheat Growers' Ass'n v. Brooks, 263 Pac. 787 (Kan.
1928) (transfer of crop to landlord in payment of debt). But of, Inland
Empire Dairy Producers' Ass'n v. Melander, 134 Wash. 145, 235 Pac. 12
(1925) (transfer to wife held to relieve member). Under statutes estab-
lishing conclusive presumptions that the member landlord has control over
the product of his land, the courts in some states have held his transferees
with notice. Wilson v. Monte Vista Potato Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 260 Pac.
1080 (Colo. 1927); see Sapiro, Law of Co-operative Marketing Associations
(1926) 15 KY. L. J. 1, 19-20; Note (1928) 41 HARv. L, R.v. 668. But of.
Louisiana F. B. Cotton Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Clark, 160 La. 294, 107
So. 115 (1926) (statutory presumption invalid as denial of constitutional
rights). Where the statute is silent on this subject, there is conflict.
Tobacco Growers' Co-op Ass'n v. Bissett, 187 N. C. 180, 121 S. E. 446 (1924)
(landlord responsible only for tobacco received from share-tenants); Ore.
gon Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Lentz, 107 Ore. 561, 212 Pac. 811 (1923)
(lessee with notice bound); see Note (1927) 15 KY. L. J. 231. Specific
performance is generally denied where the agreement is construed to give
the defendant the option of performing or paying liquidated damages.
COOK, CAsEs ON EqUITY (1926) 396, n. 8. But there is a contrary tendency
in co-operative marketing cases. Manchester Dairy System v. Hayward,
82 N. H. 193, 132 Atl. 12 (1926); Minnesota Wheat Growers' Ass'n. v.
Huggins, 162 Minn. 471, 203 N. W. 420 (1925); see Note (1926) 4 NED.
L. REV. 361, 362-3. Contra: Bishop v. Alabama F. B. Cotton Ass'n, 215
Ala. 388, 110 So. 711 (1926). The holding of the instant case is a further
recognition'of the necessity of controlling the members' crops if the associa-
tion is to be effective. Consistent with this policy, the typical co-operative
marketing statute validates a liquidated damage provision in the contract.
Ark. Acts 1921, Act 116, § 17; Idaho Laws 1921, c. 124, § 17; see Henderson,
Co-operative Marketing Associations (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 91, 98, n. 16.
In the absence of such authorization, the courts are divided over the en-
forcement of such damage stipulations. Ex parte Baldwin County Pro-
ducers' Corp, 203 Ala. 345, 83 So. 69 (1919) (upholding 3% charge on
gross sales); Reeves v. Decorah Farmers' Co-op. Society, 160 Iowa 194,
140 N. W. 844 (1913) (1 cent per bushel held invalid restraint). Where
such stipulations are allowed, any sum bearing a reasonable relation to the
actual damages will be supported. The courts are, however, confused on
the matter of definition. Neb. Wheat Growers' Ass'n v. Smith, 212 N. W.
39 (Neb. 1927) (25 cents per bushel reasonable) ; Bullville Milk Producers'
Ass'n v. Armstrong, 108 Misc. 582, 178 N. Y. Supp. 612 (Sup. Ct, 1919)
(10 dollars per cow per annum valid). But cf. Dairymc's League Co-op.
Ass'n v. Holmes, 207 App. Div. 429, 202 N. Y. Supp. 663 (4th Dep't 1924).
In a few instances the courts have refused to enforce the stipulation at all
as being an arbitrary and lump sum and violative of the defendant's right
to a jury trial on the damage issue. Oklahoma Cotton Growers' Ass'n v.
Salyer, 243 Pac. 232 (Okla. 1925) (five dollars per one hundred pounds).
It is suggested that the intent of the parties be the deciding factor. See
Anaheim Citrus Fruit Ass'n v. Yoeman, 51 Cal. App. 759, 761, 197 Pae.
959, 960 (1921). This argument is especially cogent in view of the dis-
rupting influence of a breach upon the association. Under the holding of
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the instant case, even if the defendant sold the produce of only one acre
out of the sixty-three cultivated, the recovery would nevertheless be 6300 1.
This would seem to be a weapon sufficiently formidable to discourage such
a breach.
EVIDENCE--ADmISSION By AGENT-REPORT Op AUToMoIL ACcWErT.M
The plaintiff's automobile was badly damaged in a collision with that of
the defendant, which was being driven at the time by the defendant's con.
The plaintiff sued for damages and offered in evidence a certified copy of
the report made, as required by law [Conn. Acts 1923, c. 257, § 11], by
the defendant's son to the State Department of Motor Vehicles. The lower
court excluded the evidence. Held, on appeal, iztcr alia, that the evidence,
though inadmissible as a report made to a public officer pursuant to a duty
imposed by statute, was admissible as a declaration of an agent made in
the course of his agency. Judgment reversed. Ezzo v. Gc7cwiah, 142 AtI.
461 (Conn. 1928).
The fiction of agency adopted by the courts in applying the "family car"
doctrine to hold parents responsible for the negligence of their children has
been severely criticized. Lattin, Vicarlozns Liability and the Family Ato-
mnobile (1928) 26 MImC. L. RLT. 846; (1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 359. But it ap-
pears that the practical necessity of holding the owner financially responsi-
ble outweighs the theoretical objections. Hutchiw v. Haffncr, 63 Colo. 305,
167 Pac. 966 (1917); Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. REV. 513; see N. Y. Laws
1924, c. 534. When the son is held an agent in respect to his acts, logical
consistency would seem to make the father responsible likewise for what the
son says. Ambrose v. Young, 100 W. Va. 452, 130 S. E. 810 (1926) (otatc-
ment of speed); MeCallister v. Farra, 117 Ore. 278, 243 Pac. 7651 (1926)
(admission of responsibility). Thus the further step taken by the court in
holding the son's report to the Commissioner admissible as within the ceope
of his authority as agent to make the statement is a plausible e-:ttn~ion.
See 2 WIGMORE, EVMIENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1078. A number of jurisdictions,
however, would still exclude the statement as clearly not part of the ever-
inconclusive res gestae. See HUDDY, AUTOMO ILES (8th ed. 1927) § 769;
(1924) 24 CoT. L. Ruv. 315. And the instant decision scems to Le an exten-
sion of the theory of agency beyond the practical nece.-sity on which the
"family purpose" doctrine rests. Note (1926) 32 W. VA. L. Q. 263. A
valid objection to such an extension is that reports of accidents to the State
Department of Motor Vehicles, being required by law for an important
administrative purpose, should be the subject of a privilege, to encourage
compliance with the statute and full disclosure. 5 WiGmOR, op. cit. supra
§ 2377 (3). But cf. Note (1925) 19 ILL. L. REV. 196. On the other hand,
such reports, if admitted, are clearly relevant although not conclusive evi-
dence. Perhaps the instant case, though worked out in terms of agency,
finds its justification in the accessibility of the evidence, and the practical
certainty of its truth. Cf. 1 WIG ORE, op. cit. sLpra § 10.
INJUNCTIONS-FOREIGN JUDGMENT-ENFORCEMENT ABROAD RESmIL ED.-
The defendant, a British subject had by fraudulent testimony obtained a
judgment in the Turkish courts against the plaintiff steamship company.
Without proceeding further in Turkey the plaintiff sued in England to
enjoin the defendant from enforcing his judgment in Turkey. The lower
court denied the injunction. Held, on appeal, that the defendant be enjoined
from enforcing his Turkish judgment. Ellerman Lacs Ltd. v. Rcad, [1928]
2 K. B. 144.
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A person within equity's jurisdiction may be enjoined from doing any act
even outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court. See Niagara Falls Int.
Bridge Co. v. Grand T. Ry., 241 N. Y. 85, 92, 148 N. E. 797, 799 (1925);
Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners (1913) 26 HARv. L, REV.
283, 293; CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEUENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926) § 101. En-
joining an individual from proceeding with an action in a foreign country
is generally held not an interference with the jurisdiction of the foreign
court. See Hyafill v. Buffalo Marine Co., 266 Fed. 553, 554 (IV. D. N. Y.
1919) ; ef. MAITLAND, EQUITY (1909) 9 (historical origin of principle). Thus
injunctions have been issued to restrain a party from proceeding with an
action before the court of a sister state. Cameron v. Abbott, 258 S. W. 562
(Tex. Civ. App. 1924); (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 360. Similarly where the
action was brought in a foreign county. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 App.
Div. 104, 218 N. Y. Supp. 87 (1st Dep't 1926) (divorce in Mexico); Hyafill
v. Buffalo Marine Co., supra (debt in Canada). Where fraudulent testi-
mony is shown in procuring a judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal,
English courts have denied a recovery on the judgment in England. Abouloff
v. Oppenheimer, 10 Q. B. D. 295 (1882). And dicta to that effect may be
found in American decisions. See Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co.,
219 App. Div. 120, 122, 219 N. Y. Supp. 284, 286 (3d Dep't 1927). But no
previous case has been found which enjoins enforcement of a foreign judg-
ment abroad. In the instant case the equity decree in personam has
afforded a new, if not an altogether effective, means for preventing a
denial of justice in a foreign court. This result has been obtained by other
means in the United States, where the courts occasionally recognize injunc-
tion proceedings of sister states. Thus proceedings were abated where the
court of a sister state had enjoined a party from proceeding with the action.
Fisher v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846 (1916). But
see State v. District Court, 140 Minn. 494, 498, 168 N. W. 589, 591 (1918).
And recovery on a prior judgment rendered in the same state was refused
when the court of a sister state enjoined the enforcement of the judgment in
its own jurisdiction. Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156 (1854). In the absence
of international comity analogous to that above, the English court had no
choice but to grant the embracing injunction in its effort to do justice
between the parties. 1 PIGGOTT, FOREIGN JUDGMENTS (1908) 425 (stressing
the desirability but finding no precedent of a foreign court recognizing an
English injunction).
LANDLORD AND TENANT-SUMi IAY PROCEEDINGS-LIMITATIONS AND CON-
DITIONS.-A leased premises for a term of years. The lease provided that
the landlord should have the power to terminate the lease upon a certain
date by giving the tenants sixty days' notice in writing, should he elect to
erect a new building on the premises. The plaintiff held under A. Notice
was given, and when the defendant failed to surrender possession, the plain-
tiff instituted statutory summary proceedings to recover possession on the
ground that there was a holdover after the expiration of the term [N.
Y. C. P. A. § 1410(1)]. The petition was dismissed. Held, on appeal,
that a limitation was created rather than a condition, since the whole
purpose was to provide for an automatic expiration of the term. Judg-
ment reversed. Burnee Corp. v. Uneeda Pure Orange Drink Co., 230
N. Y. Supp. 239 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
The New York statute was intended to give a remedy similar to the com-
mon law action of ejectment but in a summary manner. See Oakley v.
Schoonmaker, 15 Wend. 226, 229 (N. Y. 1836). The relation of landlord
and tenant must exist. Benjamin v. Benjamin, 1 Seld. 383 (N. Y. 1851);
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see DeVita v. Piansan4i, 127 Misc. 611, 612, 217 N. Y. Supp. 43, ,A40
(Sup. Ct. 1926). But summary proceedings cannot be invozed merely be-
cause the landlord and tenant have agreed thereto. Riescfeld Inc. v. R.-W.
Realty Co., 22S N. Y. Supp. 145 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 192S). The difficulty
arises in determining whether the term has "expired." "Expiration of the
term" may occur by lapse of time. See Oaklcy -,,. Schoonmakcr, =,.pr& at
230. Or by its own limitation." Mater of SzpaI:owz-ki, 160 App. Div. 573,
151 N. Y. Supp. 211 (4th Dep't 1915) ; see Krazer 'v. Ambcrg, 4 N. Y. Supp.
613 (C. P. 1339), aff'd, 115 N. Y. 655, 21 N. E. 1119 (1889). But it doe-
not refer to a mere breach of condition. Beach 'v. Arion, 9 N. Y. 35 (1853).
In the latter case, the br~ach only renders the lease voidable at the option
of the lessor, and the term continues until the option is exercised by bring-
ing an action of ejectment. Scason good -. Smith, 11S Misc. 839, 195 N. Y.
Supp. 340 (Sup. Ct. 1921). The problem accordingly, is whether the provi-
sion in the lease is a limitation. Where the lease provides for its termination
ipso facto upon the happening of an act or contingency, without the require-
ment of any further act on the part of the lessor, there is a limitation.
2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TEn.IT (1912) § 194 (c); of. Morton v. Mfir,
70 N. Y. 247 (1877) (performance of the act by the lessor itself terminat-
ing the lease). However where the lessor is to have the option to detcrmnine
the estate upon the happening of a future event, there is a condition.
Janes v. Paddell, 67 Misc. 420, 122 N. Y. Supp. 70 (Sup. Ct. 1910). But
see Hollander v. Horowitz, 206 N. Y. Supp. 184 (Sup. Ct. 1924). But
where the lessor is to have the option of terminating the lease by giving
notice, there is a limitation, since the notice, and not the breach of the con-
dition or occurrence of the contingency, terminates the lease. Matter of
Madison Realty Corp. v. Marth, 233 N. Y. 683, 135 N. E. 9G9 (1922); cca
Martin v. Crossley, 46 Misc. 254, 256, 91 N. Y. Supp. 712, 714 (Sup. Ct.
1905). The instant case in holding that immediately on notice being given,
a limitation attached to the tenants' term, is in line with the deciions
under the statute. Miller v. Levi, 44 N. Y. 439 (1871). And it would
also seem to come within the historical view of a limitation. Cf. CmLusS,
REAL PROPRTY (187)* 197; 2 BL. Cormi. *155.
MORTGAGES--TAx TITLE-EFFECT OF AcquIsrrioN BY JuNioR Mofl-GAGr.-.
A junior mortgagee was assignee of a certificate of tax sale of the mort-
gaged property. After the expiration of the statutory period of redemption
the junior mortgagee obtained a tax deed. His receiver brought a bill to
quiet title. The defendant, the senior mortgagee, ashed that title be quict' l
in himself, proving a sheriff's deed to him, dated one year after the tax dcd
and issued after the foreclosure of his mortgage. From a decree in favor
of the plaintiff, the defendant appeals. Held, intr alk (one judge di';-
senting), that the decree be reversed and title be quieted in the defendant
upon reimbursement of the plaintiff for the amount expended in obtain-
ing the tax deed. Baird v. Fischer, 220 N. W. 392 (N. D. 1928).
Statutes regulating the sale of land for delinquent taxes generally provide
that a proper purchaser obtains a clear title, subject only to redemption by
a qualified party during a specified period. 3 CooLEY, LTxw OF T,*LTIO*
(4th ed. 1924) § 1492. The purchase at a tax sale by a mortgagee generally
does not have this effect. The mortgagee is given an additional lien on the
land for the sum expended. Farmzcr v. Ward, 75 N. J. Eq. 33, 71 Atl. 401
(1908) (lien good against the mortgagor); Comz. Mital Life In;s. Co. -0.
Bzdte, 45 Mich. 113, 7 N. W. 707 (131) (lien good against a senior mort-
gagee). But he cannot upon the expiration Of the statutory period of
redemption assert "title" so as to cut off the power of the mortgagor or
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other mortgagees to redeem from this encumbrance in the usual way.
Cauley v. Sutton, 150 N. C. 327, 64 S. E. 3 (1909); Conn. Mutual Lifo Ins.
Co. v. Bulte, supra. The same rules are applied to a mortgagee who obtains
an outstanding tax sale certificate by assignment. First National Bank v.
McCarthy, 18 S. D. 218, 100 N. W. 14 (1904) (added to mortgagee's lion
in foreclosure action); Finlayson v. Peterson, 11 N. D. 45, 89 N. W. 855
(1902) (mortgagor can quiet title upon reimbursement); Norton v. Myers,
74 Minn. 484, 77 N. W. 298 (1898) (senior mortgagee can foreclose subject
to the lien). A distinction is made where the mortgagee procures an out-
standing tax deed. Safe-Deposit Co. v. Wickhem, 9 S. D. 341, 69 N. W. 14
(1896) (title quieted in junior mortgagee who purchased the deed). The
disability of the mortgagee is generally put upon the ground that one who
has a duty to pay taxes should not be permitted to better his title as a
result of his own default. 3 CooEY, op. cit. supra §§ 1437, 1440; see Conn. MA-
tual Life Ins. Co. v. Bulte, supra at 122,7 N. W. at 710; Note L. R. A. 1917D
522. This principle would apply where a mortgagee has contracted to pay
taxes or is in possession, but it is questionable whether it has any proper
application to the ordinary mortgagee out of possession, as in the instant
case. In this latter situation a few courts have adopted what seems to
be a sounder view, giving the mortgagee out of possession the power to
acquire rights equally with a stranger. Jones v. Black, 18 Okla. 344, 88
Pac. 1052, 11 Ann. Cas. 753 (1907). This does not operate harshly against
the mortgagor and other mortgagees since, under the tax statutes, they
can redeem from the tax sale. 4 CooLEY, op. cit. supra § 1565. And the
incentive to the mortgagor and mortgagees to pay taxes more promptly
and to purchase at tax sale would seem to be increased. Cf. dissent in
instant case, supra at 899.
REAL PROPERTY-EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION-APPARENCY.-The defend-
ants and the plaintiff each held, under a common grantor, one of three
adjacent plots, all of which had access to a public sewer. The grantor had
connected the houses on these plots by a common underground sewer,
emptying across the plaintiff's lot. The plaintiff's plumber accidentally
discovered a plat in the city engineer's office showing the sewers, the exist-
ence of which was theretofore unknown to the parties. The plaintiff sought
an injunction against the continued trespass, which was refused. Held,
on appeal, that the decree for the defendants be affirmed, on the ground
that as the sewer was reasonably necessary, and apparent to one ordinarily
conversant with the subject, i.e., the plumber, an easement existed by implied
grant. Wiesel v. Smira, 142 Atl. 148 (R. I. 1928).
Where one burdens one portion of his land for the benefit of another, and
conveys the part benefited, as in the instant case, an easement by implied
grant will be created only if it is "apparent, continuous and necessary."
Kelly v. Nagle, 150 Md. 125, 132 Atl. 587 (1926); cf. Robinson v. Hillman,
36 App. D. C. 241 (1910); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 1272.
The courts generally consider an easement apparent if its existence is
indicated by signs which might be seen or known on a careful inspection
by a person familiar with the premises. 2 TIFFANY, op. Cit. supra 1278;
Butterworth v. Crawford, 46 N. Y. 349 (1871); (1926) 75 U. or PA.
L. REV. 83. The same result is reached if there is knowledge of such facts
as to put one on inquiry. Larsen v. Peterson, 53 N. J. Eq. 88, 30 Atl. 1094
(1895) (knowledge of well and visible pump). Otherwise, buried or con-
cealed drains can pass as easements only by express grant. Robinson v.
Hillman, supra; Butterworth v. Crawford, supra; Scott v. Boutel, 64 Va.
1 (1873); Covell v. Bright, 157 Mich. 419, 122 N. W. 101 (1909); Ricci
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v. Naples, 142 Atl. 452 (Conn. 1928). A totally concealed and unsus-
pected encumbrance, undisclosed by any document of record, as in the
instant case, can hardly be regarded as "apparent." Furthermore, ready
access to a public sewer would seem to indicate that the sewer in the
instant case was merely "convenient"l rather than "reasonably neccssary."
Cf. (1911) 9 MIcH. L. Rnv. 709.
SALEs-EsTOPPEI,-MisrREPRESENTATIONS IN BILs or LAD=x.-Under a
contract of sale calling for shipment from Japan to New York by a certain
date, goods were delivered to the respondent carrier who warehoused them,
but issued an on-board bill of lading, containing exemptions from responsi-
bility for loss from an act of God or theft. Subsequently, and after the
specified shipment date, the goods were stolen during the confusion following
an earthquake. A New York bank paid the draft with bill of lading at-
tached, and was reimbursed by the seller, who, on failure of respondent to
make delivery, filed a libel in personam;. The lower court refused to cnforca
an estoppel against the defendant holding that, between shipper and carrier,
the latter's representation was merely an acknowledgment of receipt which
could be contradicted, and libellant received only shipper's rights under the
bill, and that no intent to have subsequent parties act in reliance could
be inferred. Held, on appeal, that as the bill of lading led both the paying
bank and the libellant to conclude that the contract with the seller had been
fulfilled, the libellant should recover, since his payment was sufficint reli-
ance upon which to enforce an estoppel. Judgment reversed. Olfv-ic Struzzq
Goods Corp. v. Osaka Shosen. Kaisha, 27 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
Though there was no specific requirement of an on-board bill, the appel-
late court construed the "shipment" requirement in the contract of sale to
mean that the goods actually be on board the vessel by the named day.
This interpretation as between buyer and seller is not to be confuzed with
the interpretation of the same word in determining the bank's obligation
to the seller on the credit. In the latter case, a "received for shipment"
bill must be honored. Vietor v. National City Bank:, 200 App. Div. 557,
193 N. Y. Supp. 868 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd, 237 N. Y. 538, 143 N. E. 733
(1923); cf. The Ship "Marlborongh Hill" v. Cowan & Sons, Ltd., [1921]
1 A. C. 444; Diamond Alkali Export Corp. 'v. Fl. Bourgeois, [1921] 3 K. B.
443 ("received for shipment" bill held an improper document, but no show-
ing of custom to accept either "on board" or "received for shipment" bills) ;
J. Aron & Co. v. Comnptoir Wegirnont, [1921] 3 K. B. 435; see McLaughlin,
The Evolution of the Ocean Bill of Lading (1925) 35 Y=LE L. J. 54S.
There, however, the buyer would be aware, from the "received for shipment"
provision, that seller might not have fulfilled the "shipment" requirement
of the seller-buyer contract. Thus, libellant's reliance in the instant case
would rather seem to consist in his being lulled into inactivity in asserting
his contract rights against the seller. The same result could be reached by
discarding these doubtful theories of reliance, and affording any holder of
the bill the status of a third party purchaser, at least as to the carrier's
statements regarding the receipt of the goods. Although as between shipper
and carrier all statements may be open to contradiction, it would seem
desirable that as to assignees, any such material representation should not
be so susceptible. Cf. Higgins -v. Anglo-Algerian S. S. Co., Ltd., 24S Fed.
386 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); Cornpanfa Navicra, Vasconzada v. C2hnrchill & Sim,
[1906] 1 K. B. 237. Furthermore, an intent to have subsequent parties rely
on a bill of lading might well be inferred because of the prospective free
transfers such documents are known to undergo. Bankh of Batavia v. N. Y.
L. E. & W. Ry., 106 N. Y. 195, 12 N. E. 433 (1SS7); cf. Glanzer v,. Shplzcherd,
233 N. Y. 236, 240, 135 N. E. 275, 276 (1922).
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS-CONTRACTS NOT PERFORMABLE WITHIN ONE YEA=-
The defendant orally promised the plaintiff that, if he were the highest bidder,
his bid would be accepted, and a written agreement executed pursuant
thereto, according the plaintiff the exclusive privilege for fifteen years of
placing advertisements in all passenger cars and motor busses operated
by the defendant. Provisions in the proposed form made the agreement
terminable by the defendant in case of insolvency of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff was the highest bidder and, on the defendant's refusal to accept
his bid, brought action for breach of contract. Judgment was given for
the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the agreement was within the Statute
of Frauds, being an agreement to execute a contract not performable
within one year, notwithstanding the possibility of termination within
a year. Judgment affirmed. Union Car Advertising Co. v. Boston Ele-
vated Ry., 26 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
When no definite time has been set for performance, and the contract is
terminable upon the occurrence of a contingency, it is not within the Statute
of Frauds. Warner v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 164 U. S. 418, 17 Sup. Ct. 147
(1896). In the case of an oral contract in which either party has what is
generally called a power of defeasance, although a more accurate term would
be a power of termination, there is a split of authority in the United States
as to whether the Statute applies. Blake v. Voigt, 134 N. Y. 69, 31 N. E.
256 (1892) (not within statute) ; Sosbee v. Clark, 86 Okla. 198, 207 Pay. 732
(1922) (accord) ; Meyer v. Roberts, 46 Ark. 80 (1885) (within Statute) ;
Wagmere v. Dunnell, 29 R. I. 580, 73 Atl. 309 (1909) (accord). In England,
however, it is well settled that the Statute does apply. Hanau v. Ehrlich,
[1911] 2 K. B. 1056, aff'd, [1912] A. C. 39. All of these contracts may be
classified into three groups. Cf. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 495, 500.
The contract may be considered fully performed upon its termination by the
occurrence of the contingency within the year, and thus not within the
Statute. Standard Oil Co. v. Denton, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 906, 70 S. W. 282
(1902) (to supply oil for five years or as long as plaintiff should remain
in business). Or the contract may be considered performable upon the
happening of the contingency within one year, in which case the same result
is reached. Young Men's Christian Association v. Estill, 140 Ga. 291, 78
S. E. 1075 (1913) (to pay as soon as work begins). Finally, the perform-
ance intended by the parties may be considered defeated by the happening
within the year of a contingency which is not provided for in the agreement;
and then the Statute applies. Bracegirdle v. Heald, 1 B. & Ald. 722 (1818)
(such as death of the promisor in a contract for personal service for a
period longer than a year). Much of the confusion in considering the
applicability of the Statute arises from failure to keep in mind the distinc-
tion between a contingency that completes the promised performance, and
one that defeats or prevents it. See Wooldridge v. Stern, 42 Fed. 311, 315
(C. C. W. D. Mo. 1890). In a case of a conditional power of termination,
-where the Statute has been held not to apply, it has been said that, since
termination is permitted by the terms of the contract, it is within the con-
templation of the parties and amounts to a completion of performance.
See Johnston v. Bowersock, 62 Kan. 148, 160, 61 Pac. 740, 744 (1900).
The principal case is one of a power of termination conditioned upon
the occurrence of a contingency, and it would seem when the insolvency
occurred within a year and the defendant exercised his power, that the
contract would be fully performed in accordance with the agreement within
a year, and therefore should not be within the Statute.
TAXATION-RECOVERY OF ILLEGAL EXACTION-VOLUNTARY OR COERCIVE
PAYMENTS.-To avoid a penalty of nine per cent interest on its tax bill,
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the plaintiff paid a part of the bill pending its appeal to the superior court,
where the true amount of taxes owed was subsequently found to be lezs than
the amount paid. In the lower court the plaintiff recovered this execzz.
Held, on appeal, that a judgment be directed for the defendant on the
ground, inter alia, that since there was no threat of levy on the plaintiff's
property pending the appeal of the tax bill [Conn. Gen. Stat. (1913) §
1242], the payment was "voluntary" and could not be recovered. Vcz-ra,
Co. v. Town of Stamford, 142 AtL 573 (Conn. 1928).
In the absence of statute, the payment of an illegal tax "voluntarily,"
and without coercion, bars subsequent recovery by the payor. Uion, Lard
& Timber Co. v. Pearl River County, 141 Iiss. 131, 10G So. 277 (1923)
(no protest at the time of payment); Beck v. State, 219 N. W. 197 (Wis.
1928) (payment to avoid a penalty of six per cent interest and to secure a
discount); Chapm an & Dewey Land Co. v. Board, 172 Ar. 414, 233 S. W.
910 (1926) (where illegality of tax could be made a defense in a suit by
the collector); see (1927) 37 YAiM L. J. 255. The municipality is raid to
need assurance that taxes voluntarily paid may be applied immediately
to its needs. See City of Louisville v. Becker, 139 Ky. 17, 25, 129 S. W. 311,
314 (1910). But the unfairness of allowing the retention of illegal exactions
has prompted a number of courts to give a broad interpretation to wbat
constitutes "coercion" for the purpose of allowing recovery of illegal taxez.
Thus the immediate threat of seizure of property has been held coercion.
St. Louis Basket & Box Co. v. Lauderdale County, 146 Tenn. 413, 241 S. W.
99 (1922). Contra: School v. Harding, 163 N. E. 15 ( fll. 1928) (question-
able decision). So too the threat of suspension of the right to do buZiness
in the state. Atchison T. & S. Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 2S0, 02 Sup. Ct.
216 (1911). Similarly the threat of penalties constituting a lien upon real
estate. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chambcrlain, 92 Conn. 199, 102 At.
600 (1917). Or where there was merely a penalty of two per cent per
month on the unpaid tax. City of San AWton o v. Grayburg Oi8 Co., 259
S. W. 985 (Tem. Civ. App. 1924). In a few states, statutes authorizing the
recovery of illegal taxes have been interpreted to include even thoze paid
"voluntarily." City of Clifton Forge v. McDaniel, 143 Va. 325, 130 S. E.
414 (1925); (1926) 12 VA. L. Rzv. 433. The refusal to allow recovery of
voluntary payments might well discourage prompt payment of disputed
taxes. Public policy would seem best served by permitting the recovery of
illegal tax exactions, where no peculiar circumstances justifying their re-
tention are shown and this result might well have been reached in the in-
stant ease. See Pacific Coal and Lumber Co. v. Picrce County, 133 Wash.
278, 282, 233 Pac. 953, 954 (1925).
ToRTs--AuTo iOBILES-CONSTRUTION or STATuTE LnIITING RrSrFONS-
iBInTn o' DRivE& To GuEST.-The plaintiff, a passenger in the car of the
defendant, her husband, was injured by his negligence and brought suit.
The lower court directed a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that
the statute [Conn. Acts 1927, c. 308], limiting the driver's responsibility
to gratuitous passengers to cases of "heedlessness or recless" conduct,
required, in effect, wilful and wanton conduct. Held, on appeal (two justces
dissenting on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional as dis-
criminatory), that although "heedless" may mean "negligent," such a con-
struction -would render the statute nugatory, as affecting no change in
the common law. Judgment affirmed. Silvcr v. Silver, 143 Atl. 240 (Conn.
1928).
Limitations of responsibility similar to that imposed by the statute in the
instant ease have been effected by judicial decision in a few jurisdictions.
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Peavy v. Peavy, 36 Ga. App. 202, 136 S. E. 96 (1926); Manning v. Simp.
son, 159 N. E. 440 (Mass. 1928). But in the absence of contributory
negligence, a guest in an automobile may generally recover for injuries
occasioned by the negligence of the driver. Black v. Goldwober, 172 Ark.
862, 291 S. W. 76 (1927); Sheean v. Foster, 80 Cal. App. 56, 251 Pac. 235
(1926). And such a recovery has been allowed the wife against her
husband. Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 At. 432 (1925); Note
(1924) 38 HAIv. L. REV. 383. Contra: Riser v. Riser, 240 Mich. 402,
215 N. W. 290 (1927). Where strict construction would render a
statute nugatory, as in the instant case, some courts adopt a liberal
construction to give the statute effect. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton
Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 Sup. Ct. 350 (1907); see Woollcott v. Shubert, 217
N. Y. 212, 220, 111 N. E. 829, 831 (1916). The statute does not appear
to be discriminatory. Classifications for various purposes based on the
ownership, use, or operation of automobiles, as distinguished from other
vehicles, have been generally upheld. Garrett v. Turner, 235 Pa. 383, 84
Atl. 354 (1912) (service of process); Westfalls Storage Co. v. Chicago,
280 Ill. 318, 117 N. E. 439 (1917) (licenses); HUDDY, AUToMoBILES (8th
ed. 1927) §§ 57, 59. And distinguishing guests in automobiles from guests
in other situations for the purpose of the instant statute seems no more
unreasonable. But of. Birmingham & T. Ry. v. Carpenter, 194 Ala. 141,
69 So. 626 (1915). The use of "liability" insurance is now widespread, and
in several'jurisdictions is compulsory. MAss. Cum. STAT. (1927) c. 159
§ 46; Conn. Acts 1927, c. 161 (compulsory under certain circumstances).
To permit recovery for mere negligence probably encourages collusive
suits at the expense of the insurance companies. But to deny it leaves
a large class of injuries for which there can be no recovery. See Jessup v.
Davis, 115 Neb. 1, 21, 211 N. W. 190, 197 (1926). The prevention of
collusive suits hardly seems to justify the legislature's departure from
the established common law rule. Cf. Allen, Why Do Courts Coddle
Automobile Indemnity Companies (1927) 61 Am. L. Ray. 77.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-RECOVERY FOR INJURY DUE To EMOTIONAL DISTURB-
ANCES.-The plaintiff arranged with the defendant railroad for the trans-
portation of her deceased husband's remains on the same train with her. The
defendant negligently failed so to ship the corpse, and the plaintiff, learn-
ing of its absence, fainted and fell, suffering physical injury thereby. In
a suit for these injuries and mental suffering, the defendant's demurrer to
the complaint was overruled. Held, on appeal, that judgment be affirmed.
Clemm v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 268 Pac. 103 (Kan. 1928).
In the abgence of physical impact, negligence causing an emotional
disturbance will not support a cause of action. Cole v. Cray, 70 Kan.
705, 79 Pac. 604 (1925); BURDICK, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1926) 56, n.
83. But courts agree that fright resulting from physical injury is compen-
sable. Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 23 App. Div. 141, 48 N. Y. Supp.
914 (2d Dep't 1897); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432
(1926). And many jurisdictions allow recovery when there are physical
consequences from an emotional disturbance. Hanford v. Omaha & C. B.
Street R. R., 113 Neb. 423, 203 N. W. 643 (1925) ; Kenny v. Wong Len, 81
N. H. 427, 128 Atl. 343 (1925); Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 1148.
Others refuse recovery unless the emotional disturbance is accompanied by
a contemporaneous physical impact. Mitchell v. Rochester R. R., 151 N. Y.
107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896); McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S. W. 742
(1912) ; Spade v. Lynn & B. R. R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897). This
view, which is known as.the New York-Massachusetts rule, was the first
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reaction of the courts to this problem. Victorian Railways Comnzuxiaion v.
Coultas, 13 App. qas. 222 (1SSS). But due to the impetus of a later
English decision, the contrary view has predominated. Dzdicu v. tWkt &
Sons, [1901] 2 K. B. 669; see (1925) 34 YAx L. J. 554. The courts which
still adhere to the original doctrine have used slight pretexts to discover a
sufficient "impact." Louisville & N. R. R. -v. Robcrts, 207 Ky. 310, 269 S.
W. 333 (1925) (jarring a box-car in which the plaintiff lived); Car;-oll
v. N. Y. Pie Baking Co., 215 App. Div. 240, 213 N. Y. Supp. 553 (2d
Dep't 1926) (sight of a cockroach embedded in pie-crust about to be eaten);
Conley v. United Drug Co., 218 Mass. 233, 105 N. E. 975 (1914) (ex-
plosion caused plaintiff to faint, than fall, and injure herzelf); Colan v.
Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 14S N. Y. Supp. 39 (1st Dep't
1914) (plaintiff on seeing her children in a precarious position due to
defendant's negligence, fainted and fell); cf. O'Bricn ,. Mio-s, 220 App.
Div. 464, 221 N. Y. Supp. 621 (4th Dep't 1927). Furthermore, on the
facts of the instant case, even the latter jurisdictions in an action in
tort might allow recovery for mental anguish since there is already a
breach of duty in the improper disposition of the dead body by the de-
fendant. Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co, 220 N. Y. 249, 115 N. E.
715 (1917) (recovery for mental anguish where father's body was through
negligence buried at sea); Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 90 Ky. 263,
13 S. W. 880 (1890) (failure to deliver message of death); cf. Gardacr t,.
Cumberland Tel. Co., 207 Ky. 249, 268 S. W. 1108 (1925).
